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Aristotle and Darwin: Antagonists or 
Kindred Spirits? 
James G. Lennox 
University of Pittsburgh 
1. Introduction 
In January of 1882 William Ogle, a physician and classicist, sent 
Charles Darwin his recently published English translation of 
Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals, which contained a long and 
detailed introduction and extensive notes, philological and 
scientific. Darwin sent a brief note upon receiving the gift. But af-
ter reading Ogle’s Introduction and book I and beginning of book 
II of the translation, Darwin sent him a more detailed note in which 
he expresses his amazement at what he had been reading: 
Feb. 22, 1882 
 
My dear Dr Ogle  
 
You must let me thank you for the pleasure which 
the Introduction to the Aristotle book has given 
me. I have rarely read anything which has interested 
me more; though I have not read as yet more than 
a quarter of the book proper. From quotations 
which I had seen I had a high notion of Aristotle's 
merits, but I had not the most remote notion what 
a wonderful man he was. Linnaeus and Cuvier have 
been my two gods, though in very different ways, 
but they were mere school-boys to old Aristotle.  
We don’t know how much more of Aristotle he read. Darwin was 
ill and bed-ridden at this point in time, and on April 19 he passed 
away. As someone who has devoted much of his research for the 
past four decades to Aristotle and his influence and Darwin and his 
influence, it gives me great pleasure to imagine Darwin, during his 
last days of life, sitting reading Aristotle’s Parts of Animals with a 
smile of recognition of a kindred spirit living 2300 years earlier.1 
                                                 
1 For a detailed study of this correspondence in its historical context, see 
Gotthelf, 1999, 3-30 (reprinted in Gotthelf 2012). 
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But how could that be? For at the hands of both philosophical 
and biological followers of Darwin, a narrative has emerged to the 
effect that it was Aristotle’s influence on the history of biology that 
made it nigh on impossible to imagine a living world undergoing 
constant evolutionary change. According to this narrative, not only 
would Darwin not have seen a kindred spirit in Aristotle; he would 
have seen his principal antagonist in the history of biology. 
The purpose of this paper is to establish that this narrative is a 
myth created by neo-Darwinians and their philosophical defenders. 
I am not the first to make this claim2, but I will go about my task 
informed both by four decades of study of Aristotle’s zoological 
inquiries and the philosophy that made those inquiries possible, 
and by an almost equally lengthy study of the history of Darwin-
ism.3 
2. The Creation of a Myth 
Certainly Charles Darwin and Aristotle can sound like kindred 
spirits; take the following two quotes, one from On the Origin of 
Species characterizing natural selection, the other from Aristotle’s 
study of Animal Locomotion, identifying a presupposition of zoolog-
ical investigation. 
Although Natural Selection can act only through and 
for the good of each being, yet characters and structures, 
which we are apt to consider as of very trifling 
importance, may thus be acted on. (Darwin 1859, 
83) 
 
Nature makes nothing in vain, but always makes, 
from among the possibilities, that which is best for the 
being of each kind of animal. (Aristotle, De incessu 
animalium 2, 704b15-17) 
And yet according to legions of evolutionary biologists and philo-
sophers, such appearances are completely misleading. In this sec-
                                                 
2 Amundson1998, 153-177; Winsor, 2001, 239-254; Wilkins 2009. 
3 Cf. entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Aristotle’s Biology 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-biology/) and on Darwinism 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/darwinism/). 
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tion we will look at the creation of the Antagonism Myth and at its 
central themes and variations. 
A convenient place to begin is with that venerable defector 
from the Vienna Circle, Sir Karl Popper. Written during World 
War II and the horrors of Nazism, the first volume of Popper’s The 
Open Society and Its Enemies traced the horrors of twentieth century 
totalitarianism back to Plato and Aristotle. About Aristotle’s 
influence on the history of science he had this to say: 
Every discipline, so long as it used the Aristotelian 
method of definition has remained arrested in a 
state of empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, 
and the degree to which the various sciences have 
been able to make any progress depended on the 
degree to which they have been able to get rid of 
the essentialist method. (Popper 1945, vol. I, 206) 
Popper identifies two features of Aristotle’s philosophical method 
as roadblocks to scientific progress: a method of definition and an 
essentialist method. No doubt Popper saw these as closely related, 
for he correctly sees that in Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, 
the proper object of a definition is the essence of the definiendum, 
and an important part of scientific inquiry is aimed at discovering 
essences. But Popper’s conclusion, that this was an impediment to 
scientific progress, was not based on a detailed study of the history 
of science, but rather on deeply held skeptical views about 
induction and the nature of rationality. After all, scientific text-
books continue to be full of definitions of key terms that purport 
to identify what is essential to the objects and processes being 
defined. 
Admittedly under Popper’s influence, a young David Hull, 
prior to his becoming a leader in the resurgence of philosophy of 
biology in the 1970s, penned the following words. 
Aristotelian definition had to be abandoned both 
for species names and for ‘species’ [i.e. the species 
concept]. Typologists could ignore the actual un-
tidy distribution of properties among living 
organisms and the variety of methods of reproduc-
tion used to perpetuate species. Evolutionists could 
not. (Hull 1965, 314-326) 
3
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Like Popper, one message here is that scientific progress, at least 
in biology, required abandoning something called ‘Aristotelian 
definition’ and essentialism. But he has added a twist—a distinc-
tion between ‘typologists’ and ‘evolutionists’. That twist is likely 
due to the influence of ornithologist and systematist Ernst Mayr. 
Mayr left Berlin to take a post at the American Museum of Natural 
History in January of 1931. He was the author of one of the 
foundational documents of the so-called ‘Neo-Darwinian 
Synthesis’, Systematics and the Origin of Species, first published by 
Columbia University Press in 1942. Aristotle and Plato are not 
mentioned in it; but in his 1963 Animal Species and Evolution and its 
abridged edition, Populations, Species and Evolution (1970), he echoes 
the sentiments of Popper: 
Owing to its belief in essences this philosophy 
[Typology] is also referred to as essentialism and its 
representatives as essentialists (typologists). [They] 
were influenced by the idealist philosophy of Plato 
and the modifications of it by Aristotle. … The 
concept of unchanging essences and of complete 
discontinuities between every eidos (type) and all 
others make genuine evolutionary thinking well-
nigh impossible. (Mayr 1970, 4; cf. 11) 
Two years before Hull’s paper appears, then, Mayr identifies 
‘essentialism’ with ‘typology’, and a bit later treats ‘type’ as a 
translation of the Greek eidos (normally translated ‘form’ or ‘spec-
ies’—more on that later). The essences in question are said to be 
unchanging and they are also said to be ‘discontinuous’. And 
finally, Aristotle’s understanding of these concepts is referred to as 
a ‘modification’ of the ‘idealist philosophy of Plato’. This last step 
is critical; for as we will see all of the above claims are far more 
reasonably applied to Plato than to Aristotle. It was not unusual for 
those teaching Greek Philosophy in the Germany in which Ernst 
Mayr was educated to view Aristotle as a slightly unorthodox 
follower of Plato. But the Aristotle I will be discussing in the 
remaining sections of this essay is, on every basic philosophical 
principle, diametrically opposed to Plato. 
From this point on this myth gets promulgated with virtually 
no reference to Aristotle’s actual biology or philosophy of biology. 
Take this comment from Michael Ghiselin, who along with David 
Hull defended the idea that the lineages of populations known as 
4
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‘species’ should not be thought of as classes or kinds made up of 
individual organisms—rather the lineages themselves were individ-
uals, and names such as Canis lupus name individuals. 
[Aristotelian essences] remained, however, the 
basic object of theoretical, or we might even say 
scientific, knowledge. To understand a thing was to 
know its essence. The essences, however, retained 
their timeless and unchanging character. Indi-
vidual men might change, but for the class “man” 
to change would not even have made any sense. 
Species could not originate. (Ghiselin 1997, 7.) 
You can see from this quote why the idea of species being 
individuals would appeal to Ghiselin—individuals originate and 
change, classes defined in terms of timeless and unchanging es-
sences cannot. 
For good measure, allow me to add one more twist to the tale, 
due to another philosophical defender of the neo-Darwinian 
worldview, Elliott Sober. 
Aristotle is typical of exponents of the Natural 
State Model in holding that variation is introduced 
into a population by virtue of interference with 
normal sexual reproduction. … The essentialist 
attempts to understand variation within a species as 
arising through a process of deviation from type. 
...evolutionary theory undermined the essentialist’s 
model of variability [and] removed the need for 
discovering species essences.” (Sober 1994, 224, 
226.) 
The new twist here is the contrast between how the essentialist and 
the ‘population thinker’ view variation within a population. For the 
population thinker there is no essence or type, there are just pop-
ulations of statistically varying individuals. Variation is the norm, 
so to speak. For the essentialist, however, there is a type that serves 
as the standard; variations are seen as deviations from the norm due 
to interferences in the natural process of development.4 
                                                 
4 It is a topic for another time, but an underexplored question is exactly what 
“population thinking” is and how much of biology outside of population gen-
etics ever adopted this kind of “thinking”. With the advent of evolutionary 
5
Lennox: Aristotle and Darwin
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2017
6 
 
 
Let us sum up and move on—key to the Antagonist Myth are 
(at least) the following ideas:  
• Aristotle should be considered a reformed Platonist 
• According to Plato’s Theory of Form: knowledge 
is of eternal and changeless types of which the 
things of this world are imperfect images 
• Aristotle’s forms are Platonic forms embedded in 
matter 
• All perfect members of a species have an identical 
essence or specific form 
• All other properties are ‘accidental’ or deviations 
from type 
• Knowledge, in the form of a definition, is of the es-
sence 
• The essence is unchanging and eternal 
• Definition thus provides necessary and sufficient 
conditions for species membership 
• Reproduction maintains the species essence. 
• This was the ‘paradigm’ that Darwin needed to 
overturn 
3. Rejecting the Myth 
The rejection of this myth will involve two distinct, though related 
steps. The first step will be to provide an account of Aristotle’s 
Essentialism as it is actually displayed in his philosophy of biology 
and biological practice. We will see that it has nothing to do with 
the ‘mythic’ version. The second step will be to look at a common, 
explicitly anti-evolutionary way of defining the species concept in 
Darwin’s time, and his attempts to reorient thinking about it. The 
paper will conclude with a Coda. I will return to the question with 
which I began—could Aristotle and Darwin be kindred spirits. By 
that point we will know what Aristotle’s philosophy of biology 
actually looks like and what Darwin was really up against. We will 
be in a position to reconsider the question of how much common 
ground Aristotle and Darwin share. 
                                                 
developmental biology, it is worth reconsidering the claim that such thinking is 
a necessary condition for evolutionary thinking, as the Antagonist Myth asserts. 
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3.1. Aristotle’s Three-Step Program of Biological Inquiry 
I will here provide a somewhat simplified version of Aristotle’s 
views about how biological research ought to be carried out.5 
The first step: identifying ‘entry level kinds’ 
I begin with a passage from Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals (PA): 
In those cases where people refer to kinds in a 
clearly defined manner and where the kinds have [i] 
a single common nature and [ii] forms in them not 
too distinct from each other—we should refer to 
these animals in common as a single kind, as we do 
with the birds and the fish. And we should do the 
same with any other currently unnamed group that 
embraces—as kinds do—many forms within it. 
(PA I. 4, 644b1-6)6 
What is Aristotle up to here? In the pages leading up to this 
quotation, Aristotle has introduced a method for organizing species 
into more general groupings. Very schematically, the method 
involves taking very general kinds—he uses Birds and Fish as 
examples—identifying all the general features they share (he calls 
them ‘general differences’), and then sub-dividing those differences 
into more and more specific, determinate forms. To cite a single 
example: all birds have beaks, which differ markedly from the 
mouths of other kinds of animals; but some beaks are hooked while 
others are straight, some are wide, others narrow, some short 
others long, and so on. Aristotle recommends tracing down such 
differences for all the shared traits simultaneously, identifying more 
and more determinate forms of the general kind in this way. This 
discussion of multi-differentiae division is based, however, on an 
undefended assumption: that researchers should be able to identify 
these general kinds. Aristotle is well aware that this is not an 
obvious step: he notes, for example, that if you start with the gen-
eral category ‘flyer’, you will be starting with a group that has many 
                                                 
5 A somewhat richer account, but still introductory, can be found in my entry on 
‘Aristotle’s Biology’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Much of the research on 
which that entry is based can be found in Lennox 2001b. 
6 Translations from On the Parts of Animals are based on Lennox 2001a. 
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(but not all) insects, many (but not all) mammals, and most (but 
not all)7 birds in one group! Intuitively, this seems like a poor place 
to start. But Aristotle is not willing to base his thinking about where 
we should start on intuition. So the passage above asks, how do we 
identify kinds that are appropriate starting points for inquiry—which 
I have referred to as “entry level kinds”.8  
It will be noticed that the ‘taxonomic’ language I use in that 
passage consists of two words: ‘Form’ (eidos) and ‘Kind’ (genos). 
Eidos9 is often translated ‘species’—indeed many translators trans-
late it as ‘form’ when it is contrasted with ‘matter’ as an aspect of 
natural objects, and ‘species’ in passages like the one above, where 
it seems to refer to a sub-division of a wider kind. I find this 
practice problematic for a number of reasons I have discussed else-
where: Aristotle never suggests this word is used equivocally, and 
since this is one of his central philosophical concepts, and the one 
about which he and Plato disagree most significantly, it is very odd 
that he does not, if he does is in fact think it is equivocal; and since 
there is a reason why it seems sometimes to refer to a component 
of an individual substance and sometimes to the kind to which that 
individual belongs (namely, an individual’s form is that in virtue of 
which it is a member of that kind) it is not a good idea to translate 
it in two entirely different ways. Moreover, it is perfectly acceptable 
English to characterize, for example, a red-tailed hawk as a form of 
hawk, or hawks as forms of raptor. So…form it is! 
The point I want to focus on in this passage is that it is pro-
viding a normative account of kind identification: we should group 
different forms of animals into a wider kind when they have [i] a 
common nature and [ii] many forms not too distinct; and we should 
do so not only with commonly named animals like bird and fish, 
but also [iii] with animals that share characteristics [i] and [ii] but 
where no kind has been designated by a common name. I will soon 
give you an example of this theory in practice, so if all this is 
“floating” for you at the moment, bear with me. But one problem 
might be apparent to the reader even at this point: How is a 
                                                 
7 He is quite familiar with Ostriches—see PA IV.14, 697b14-26. 
8 Lennox 2005. This language is intended to convey a core theme of PA I.4—
that categories like ‘flyers’ and ‘swimmers’ are at too high a level, while categories 
like ‘lion’ and ‘horse’ are at too specific a level, to start an inquiry.  
9 You will recall that this Greek word appeared in the above quotation from 
Ernst Mayr (above on page 6), where he rendered it as ‘type’. 
8
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researcher going to be able to identify groups with ‘a common 
nature’ at this preliminary stage, prior to knowing what that 
common nature is? This is Aristotle’s version of the so-called 
‘Meno-problem’ expressed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue Meno: if 
you do already know it, then you don’t need to mount an inquiry 
to search for it; if you don’t already know it, how are you going to 
identify it. Aristotle’s solution to it involves articulating an 
epistemology that allows for stages of ‘knowing’: Aristotelian 
inquirers can have compelling reasons for thinking that a number 
of forms share a common nature prior to knowing what that 
common nature is—in fact getting to that stage provides you with 
clues in the search for that nature. We will see how this works 
shortly. 
The Second Step: Studying Continuous Variation 
within Kinds 
The mythic Aristotelian biologist considers variation within ‘types’ 
as inessential ‘deviations’, on the Sober construal deviations due to 
interferences with what is normal or natural. What does the actual 
Aristotle think about variation? Variation among forms of a kind is 
addressed immediately after Aristotle’s presentation of the above 
norms for identifying kinds in PA I.4. 
…it is by finding groups where the figures of the 
parts and of the whole body bear a likeness that the 
kinds have been demarcated; for example, mem-
bers of the kind ‘bird’ are related in this way to one 
another, as are members of the kind ‘fish’, the soft-
bodied animals [cephalopods] and the hard-shelled 
animals [mollusks]. For their parts are not merely 
analogous to one another, as bone in mankind is 
analogous to fish-spine in fish, but rather their parts 
are of the same kind and differ only by being larger or 
smaller, softer or harder, smoother or rougher and so on--
speaking generally, they vary by more and less. (644b8-16; 
emphasis added) 
When you start to observe what it is that birds have in common, 
you notice that, from one form of the kind to the next, the com-
mon features they all share vary continuously along many axes: 
feathers vary in length, color patterns, density and length of the 
barbs; beaks vary in hardness, length, depth, curvature; their two 
9
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legs can be longer or shorter, their toes can vary in all sorts of ways. 
These are the differences you take note of in distinguishing forms 
of a kind. There is a shared overall body plan and way of life, but 
each part, and each activity associated with it, differs in many 
measurable ways as you go from one form to the next. And 
importantly, this is precisely where Aristotle starts in the History of 
Animals. After laying out general categories of likeness, he turns 
immediately to the ways in which animals alike in kind (he again 
uses Bird and Fish as his examples) differ from each other. 
Practically speaking, most of their parts differ by 
way of the oppositions among their affections, for 
example by color or configuration, by them being 
affected some more and some less; and again by 
being greater or lesser, larger or smaller, and 
generally by excess and defect. For some of these 
[parts] have softer or harder flesh, some have a 
longer beak and others a shorter one, and some 
have many feathers and others few. Moreover, in 
these kinds different parts even belong to different 
animals; for instance some [birds] have spurs and 
others do not, and some have crests while others 
do not. But generally speaking, most of the parts 
from which the entire bulk of the animal is 
constituted are either the same or differ by 
opposition and according to excess and defect; for 
one can treat ‘the more and less’ as a sort excess 
and defect. (HA I.1, 486a25-b17) 
This methodology allows Aristotle to identify nine Great 
Kinds,10 within which the parts and overall bodily plan of the dif-
ferent sub-kinds vary only by ‘more and less’ along many dimen-
sions. One way to measure the success of his methodology is by 
comparing it with Georges Cuvier’s Embranchments of the Animal 
Kingdom, produced about 2,100 years after Aristotle had died. 
I have highlighted the kind I am going to focus on in the next 
section in order to illustrate Aristotle’s fascination with variation 
and how ‘normal’ and ‘essential’ he thinks understanding continu-
ous variation is to understanding organisms. That kind is the one 
                                                 
10 The Greek is μέγιστα γένη; See HA I.6, 490b7-6; II.15, 505b25-32. 
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he refers to simply as “the Softies” (ta malakia), and which we refer 
to as cephalopods, a form of mollusk.11 
 
Table 1. 
Aristotle’s Blooded Kinds 
 
Cetacea 
Four-legged live-bearing 
Four-legged egg-laying 
Birds 
Fish 
 
Aristotle’s Bloodless Kinds 
 
Insects  
Soft-shelled 
Hard-shelled 
Soft-bodied 
Cuvier’s Vertebrates 
 
Cetacea (aquatic mammals) 
Mammals (land) 
Reptiles, Amphibians 
Birds 
Fish 
 
Cuvier’s Invertebrates 
 
Insects 
Crustaceans 
Mollusca (shelled) 
Mollusca (soft-bodied) 
 
In order to get a concrete sense of Aristotle’s method here, let us 
begin with the opening paragraph of his discussion of the cephalo-
pods at the beginning of Book IV of the Historia Animalium. He has 
completed his discussion of the parts of the blooded animals in the 
first three books, and is now turning to the parts of the bloodless 
animals (or ‘invertebrates’).  
Among the animals called ‘soft-bodies’ these are 
the external parts: first, the so-called feet; second, 
the head, continuous with the feet; third, the sac, 
containing the internal organs, which some mistak-
enly call the head; and fourth the fin, which 
encircles the sac. In all of the soft-bodies the head 
turns out to be between the feet and the belly. 
Moreover, all have eight ‘feet’, and all have two 
rows of suckers, except for one kind of octopus. 
                                                 
11 Amazingly, Aristotle was well aware of the anatomical similarities between the 
body plan of the cephalopods and the hard-shelled Mollusks. Cf. PA IV.9, 
684b11-26. 
11
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The cuttlefish, and the large and small squids have 
a distinctive feature, two long tentacles, the ends of 
which are rough with two rows of suckers, by 
which they capture food and convey it to their 
mouth and fasten themselves to a rock when it 
storms, like an anchor. (HA IV.1, 523b22-32) 
It is important to note both what is and what is not said in this 
passage. It opens with a list of six attributes shared by all the soft-
bodied animals. (The first four are referred to as external parts, and 
are listed numerically in the Greek, but two more are mentioned in 
the next sentence, for reasons I’ll get to momentarily.) In the first 
sentence the fact that they all have ‘feet’ (or ‘arms’12, as we would 
say) is mentioned, but not how many they have; and the unusual 
placement of the head and feet is mentioned, as well as the fact that 
people often refer to the ‘sac’ as the head because of its location. 
But in the next sentence he explicitly mentions that all cephalopods 
have eight feet, and notes the oddity (compared to most other 
animals with feet) of their overall bodily configuration. He then 
mentions two distinctive features of sub-kinds within the kind. 
Almost all cephalopods have two rows of suckers on there ‘feet’, 
but there is one kind of octopus that has only one row of suckers. 
And the squids and cuttlefish are distinguished from the octopuses 
in having two additional appendages, only the ends of which have 
two rows of suckers. This is only a discussion of the external parts; 
as with the discussion of the parts of the blooded animals, to which 
(after a six chapter methodological introduction) the first three 
books were devoted, the discussion is divided up into sections on 
the external (523b22-524b1) and then the internal (524b2-525a29). 
And as it proceeds, it focuses more and more on the distinctive way 
these parts are found in more and more determinate sub-kinds, and 
any distinctive parts they have. The main externally observable 
differences between the squids and cuttlefish, on the one hand, and 
the octopuses on the other, are laid out at 524a20-32; 524b23-
525a12 is then focused on the former and the remainder of the 
chapter on the variations to be found in the many kinds of 
octopuses with which Aristotle is familiar.  
                                                 
12 It is common to refer to the eight appendages shared by octopuses and other 
cephalopods are ‘tentacles’; technically, however, that term is reserved for the 
two extra appendages of the squids and cuttlefish. 
12
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It is important, in order to counter a common misconception 
about the HA, to notice how general and universal these claims 
are, and how well organized the information is. Though I don’t 
have the space to detail the argument here, a strong case can be 
made that Aristotle has good reason to think the form of 
organization he has chosen will facilitate the search for causal 
explanations of why the different animals have the different parts 
that they have.13 
As interesting as what is in HA is what is not. Many unusual 
attributes are listed here, but not once does Aristotle provide any 
explanation for them. It might be thought that when he says that it 
is by means of those extra tentacles of the squids and cuttlefish that 
they capture food and anchor themselves during storms, he is pro-
viding an explanation. But notice that he does not say that these 
organs are present for the sake of doing these things, nor that they 
are essential to be a squid or cuttlefish. These are tasks for step 
three, which we find in treatises, such as the Parts of Animals, 
devoted to finding and providing causal demonstrations for facts 
of the kind organized in HA.  
Step Three—the search for what is causally basic, aka 
“essences”. 
 
In the context of responding to The Myth, the next point 
that needs to be stressed is that there is no single Greek 
word that corresponds to the Latin ‘essentia’ or English 
‘essence’. Here are four Aristotelian words and phrases that 
are often so translated, with more or less literal translations. 
The common core of them all is the Greek verb εἶναι, to 
be. 
 
• Οὐσία = lit. ‘beingness’; often translated ‘sub-
stance’ 
• Τὸ τί ἐστί= ‘the what it is’ 
• Τὸ τί ἠν εἶναι= ‘the being what it is’ 
• Τὸ ὀρνὶθῳ εἶναι= ‘the being for (a) bird’ 
It will be noticed, then, that all of these phrases are referring to 
what things are, or what it is to be this or that kind of thing. And 
                                                 
13 The case is laid out in the in Lennox 2001b, chs. 1-3. See too Pellegrin, 1986, 
Balme 1987a. 
13
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what becomes very clear in Posterior Analytics II is that there is an 
intimate connection between discovering what is causally basic to 
being a certain kind of thing and what it is to be that thing. With 
respect to animals, it is an animal’s peculiar way of life and the 
activities that are required by that way of life that explain why each 
animal has the parts it has with those more and less variations 
characterized in HA. Every animal of course has those general 
kinds of capacities that Aristotle collectively refers to as their psychê 
(misleadingly translated ‘soul’), their abilities to reproduce, main-
tain themselves by acquiring and transforming nutrients, to 
perceive and to locomote. But what Aristotle is clearly fascinated 
by is the wildly varied way in which animals do these things. And 
there is no clearer example of the intimate link between knowing 
what it is to be something of a certain kind and knowing what is 
causally fundamental to it than an animal. As he puts it in the De 
anima: 
The soul is the cause and principle of the living 
body. But these are said in many ways, and soul is 
similarly a cause in three of the delineated ways; for 
the soul is the cause whence motion begins, for the 
sake of which and as the beingness (οὐσία) of the 
ensouled body. That it is the cause as beingness 
(οὐσία) is clear; for the beingness (οὐσία) is the 
cause of being (εἶναι) in all cases, but being (εἶναι) 
for animals is living, and the soul is the cause and 
principle of this. (415b8-14)  
I’ve put the Greek in and used the neologism ‘beingness’ so that 
the reader not imagine that Aristotle is uttering tautologies here. In 
this case, οὐσία is a stand in for the animal’s form or ‘first actual-
ity,’ which was the conclusion of the argument in DA II.1—soul is 
the animal’s fully prepared capacity to perform the activities 
characterizing its way of life. Notice that the central theme in this 
brief, dense passage is that the animal’s soul is both what it is to be 
the animal and also its cause in two other ways—those living capac-
ities are the source of its movements, and that for the sake of which 
it has the kind of body it has. A scientific definition is, that is, a 
disguised causal explanation. 
Aristotle makes this point in APo. II.10 with a more prosaic 
example, thunder: 
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For there is a difference between saying why it 
thunders and what thunder is—in the former case 
you will answer in this way: ‘Because the fire in the 
clouds was quenched.’ But to answer ‘What is 
thunder?’ you will say ‘A noise of fire being 
quenched in clouds.’ So the same account is given 
in a different way—in the one case it is a continu-
ous demonstration, in the other a definition. 
And of course there will be no end of complications when this sim-
ple idea is translated for a domain where there are four causes, and 
one entity plays the role of three of them.  
So far this has been pretty abstract—let us now return to our 
cephalopods and see the same group of animals as the object of a 
stage 3 inquiry. 
You will recall that there was a ‘near’ universal feature of octo-
pus arms: “…and all [octopuses] have two rows of suckers, except 
for one kind of octopus.” (523b28-29; see Figure 1) 
In PA IV. 9, having established the fact in HA, he is ready to 
identify the reason why. 
Now while the other octopuses have two rows of 
suckers, one kind has a single row. This is because 
of the length and thinness of their nature; for it is 
necessary that the narrow tentacle have a single row 
of suckers. It is not, then, because it is best that they 
have this feature, but because it is necessary owing 
to the distinctive account of their being (οὐσία). 
(685b13-17) 
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There are a number of features of this explanation that are 
expected, given Aristotle’s views about scientific knowledge, but at 
least two that are surprising. There is a fact to be explained, an 
attribute common to all members of a species; and the explanation 
appeals to something that is referenced in the distinctive account 
of the being(ness) of the lesser octopus. What is surprising is [a] 
that the feature said to be in the account of its being is not a 
capacity of the soul but the dimensions either of the part or the 
whole body14 and [b] that the explanation is not teleological—“not 
because it is best.” But these features of the explanation are less 
surprising when you know what Aristotle says about biological 
explanation in PA I.1. 
                                                 
14 It is unclear in the Greek whether the ‘nature’ referred to is that of the animal 
as a whole or to the arm that has the suckers. 
Figure 1. Lesser Octopus. Photo credit: Ross Elliott on Visual Hunt / CC BY 
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Hence it would be best to say that, since this is what 
it is to be a human being, on account of this it has 
these things; for it cannot be without these parts. If 
one cannot say this, one should say the next best 
thing, i.e. either that in general it cannot be 
otherwise, or that at least it is good thus. (640a32-
b1) 
Thus that the appeal to the being of the animal to explain one of 
its features is not teleological in form is not surprising—what is 
surprising, according to most accounts of Aristotle’s philosophy of 
science, is that its bodily dimension would appear in ‘the distinctive 
account of the being’ of the lesser octopus. But this is, in point of 
fact, what distinguishes it from other kinds of octopus, and thus 
serves as the defining difference. 
For my second example of a stage 3 inquiry I remind you that 
we were told in HA IV.1 that the cuttlefish and squids have two 
long tentacles, the ends of which are rough with two rows of 
suckers.  (See Figure 2.) This was a feature that these three kinds 
had in common which distinguished them from the other 
cephalopods. There was also a clear hint of what the explanation 
for these tentacles would be, since we were told what they do with 
these parts. But knowing what they do with these parts only 
becomes an explanation when we are told that they have these parts 
for the sake of doing these things—that doing these things is the 
reason why they have these parts. Something like the following! 
Since the cuttlefish and squids have small ‘feet’ that 
are useless both for taking hold…of the rocks 
when there are waves and storms, and for feed-
ing…they have two long tentacles by which they 
moor themselves…and by which they hunt down 
prey from afar and bring it to themselves. The 
octopuses, on the other hand, don’t have these, 
because their ‘feet’ are useful for these activities. 
(PA IV.9 685a33-b2) 
That is, these animals share with the other cephalopods eight ‘feet’ 
(i.e. arms) for locomotive purposes. Now in octopuses these are 
long and suitable for finding food and grasping onto rocks—but in 
cuttlefish and squid they are not. They thus need two additional 
17
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tentacles that can be used for feeding and anchoring in storms. 
That is the reason why they have these two additional tentacles.15 
 
Now it is true that both the facts and the explanations are 
universal claims about kinds and sub-kinds of cephalopods, rather 
than about individual variations within these kinds. But notice how 
attuned Aristotle is to variations within wider kinds—differences, 
as he would say. If you see a difference displayed by a form of a 
kind, you need to look for something distinctive about that form 
of animal to explain the difference. If cuttlefish have two addition-
al, extra long tentacles, look for something distinctive about their 
way of life that explains why they have them. 
But what about individual variations—has Aristotle really no 
interest in them, or does he see them as mere deviations or 
accidents? That idea is hard to reconcile with the following passage, 
from Aristotle’s account of inheritance in GA IV.3: 
In relation to generation the distinctive and 
particular features are always stronger. For 
Koriskos is both a man and an animal; but the man 
is nearer to what is distinctive [to Koriskos] than 
the animal. And both the particular and the kind 
generate, but more so the particular; for this is the 
being (οὐσία) [of the animal], and what is coming 
to be is, while a certain sort of animal, also this 
animal here, and this is the being [of the animal]. 
                                                 
15 Aristotle is once again correct. For a somewhat horrifying introduction to 
cuttlefish feeding behavior, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
MUCduZyCHes 
Figure 2. Giant Squid.  Courtesy of the Oregon Coast Aquarium’s Oceanscape 
Network. 
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Wherefore the motions present in the seeds are 
from all such powers, potentially even from the 
ancestors, but more from those closer to one of the 
particulars, and by particular I mean Koriskos and 
Socrates. (767b31-768a3) 
GA IV is entirely concerned with variations among members of 
what we would refer to as ‘species’, starting with the most obvious 
and important one, sex differences between males and females. By 
chapter three he has moved on to puzzling facts such as that 
offspring may resemble one parent with respect to one trait and the 
other with respect to another trait; that sometimes they will look 
more like a grandparent than a parent; or that female offspring may 
resemble the male parent in non-sexual characteristics. The passage 
above provides a general framework for understanding these 
puzzling facts about inheritance. The central theme of this 
framework is that specific and generic characteristics are general 
characters passed on along with the powers (δύναμεις) or 
movements (κίνεσεις) representing the features of individual par-
ents. It is in the distinctive characteristics of the individual parents 
that being resides, not in the general characteristics. However, and 
this is what even most scholarly commentary on this passage 
misses, the movement aimed at reproducing Socrates’ distinctively 
snub nose will of necessity also be a human nose and an animal nose. 
You can describe a particular person’s nose in a way that focuses 
on its uniquely individuating features, or its distinctively human 
features, or those features which make any nose a nose. Individual 
variations are not, for Aristotle, “deviations due to interference 
with the animal’s nature”—quite the opposite! It is in those 
features that the being of the animal exists. Universals, Aristotle 
tells us repeatedly, do not exist, other than in the souls of human 
knowers.16 
4. Summing Up: Dispelling Myth No. 1 
At this point, it is my hope that the reader has a reasonable grasp 
of an Aristotelian approach to the study of living things—his philo-
                                                 
16 To keep this discussion manageable I’m being fairly dogmatic here. For a 
defense of this way of reading Aristotle, see Lennox 2001b, chapters 7 and 8, 
and Lennox 2005; and compare Balme 1987b. 
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sophy of biology, if you will. Before moving on, this is a good time 
to sum up our findings about Aristotle’s philosophy of biology. 
1. Aristotle is not a typological essentialist 
2. Aristotle is an explanatory essentialist 
3. Aristotle considers variation within and between 
kinds natural and important and in need of explan-
ation. 
4. Individual variations are most real, general similar-
ities are consequences—determinables of which 
the individual variations are the determinants. 
5. Biological research progresses through three em-
pirically driven stages: 
a. A grasp of general, ‘entry level’ kinds (e.g. ceph-
alopods) 
 
i. These are identified as loci of correlated 
parts, activities, habits, which I have dub-
bed ‘predicate profiles’ of the kind. 
 
b. A study of the continuous (more-and-less) var-
iations of the common features provides more 
and more determinate characterizations of the 
many similar forms of the general kinds (e.g. 
from cephalopod to octopus to ‘lesser octo-
pus’). 
c. Finally, an investigation into the causal relation-
ships among those differences—the causally 
basic features of an animal constituting its ‘es-
sence’, those features that constitute its being. 
As we saw, causally basic features may be activ-
ities fundamental to its way of life or distinctive 
features of its body. 
5. Dispelling Myth No. 2 
Myth number two, it will be recalled, is that it was Aristotelian 
typological essentialism that Charles Darwin was up against. In 
order to dispel this myth, we need to answer the question, ‘What 
was Darwin really up against?’. Part of the answer, of course, is that 
since Aristotle was not the sort of essentialist that the mythologists 
claimed him to be, it is unlikely that Darwin had to deal with it. But 
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that reply will be unsatisfactory without a positive picture of the 
problems that Darwin faced in convincing the naturalists of his day 
to at least consider the idea that species are genealogically related. 
A good place to start is with a book that Darwin considered his 
bible while on H. M. S. Beagle, Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology. 
Near the beginning of Volume 2, much of which is devoted to the 
very problems at the core of On the Origin of Species, Lyell writes: 
…the majority of naturalists agree with Linnaeus 
that all individuals propagated from one stock have 
certain distinguishing characters in common, which 
will never vary, and which have remained the same 
since the creation of each species. (Lyell Vol. II 
1832 [1990], 3) 
And the following comment of William Hopkins, reviewing 
Darwin’s Origin, is a good example of the perspective described by 
Lyell:  
Every natural species must by definition have had 
a separate and independent origin, so that all theor-
ies…which assert the derivation of all classes of 
animals from one origin, do, in fact, deny the exist-
ence of natural species at all. (Reprinted in Hull 
1973, 241) 
The first thing to note here is the concern about origins and 
creation. Aristotle, though he was aware of cosmogonists before 
him who had tales to tell about the origins of animals and humans, 
found them all to be fanciful speculation, not much better that the 
myths they were intended to supplant. The second thing to note is 
that each origin must be ‘separate and independent’—that two 
species could have had a common origin is ruled out. And finally, 
once created each species must not vary and must stay the same. 
What Darwin was up against was a thinly naturalized version of a 
Genesis-like creation myth. How does Charles Darwin respond? In 
Origin, ch. 2, after reviewing the evidence that highly trained 
naturalists cannot agree on how to distinguish between varieties 
and species, he stipulates how he will use the ‘term’ species: 
From these remarks it will be seen that I look at the 
term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of 
convenience to a set of individuals closely resembl-
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ing each other, and that it does not essentially differ 
from the term variety, which is given to to less 
distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term vari-
ety, again, in comparison with mere individual 
differences, is also applied arbitrarily, and for mere 
convenience sake. (Darwin, 1859, 52) 
It is important to stress that Darwin is discussing the terms ‘species’ 
and ‘variety’, not species terms such as Canis lupus (which according 
to Wikipedia has 38 sub-species, one of which includes the hun-
dreds of varieties of domestic dog) or Octopus gardineri, one of 
dozens of species of Octopus. In this passage, Darwin identifies 
two ‘more-and-less’ distinctions between varieties and species: 
resemblance and constancy. To be given a species designation, a 
group of individuals must be more distinct and less ‘fluctuating’ 
than individuals that constitute a variety. But he is stressing that 
these distinctions fall along continuua, so where one ‘draws the 
line’ will be somewhat arbitrary. Again in the concluding chapter 
of On the Origin of Species: 
In short, we shall have to treat species in the same 
manner as those naturalists treat genera, who admit 
that genera are merely artificial combinations made 
for convenience. This may not be a cheering 
prospect; but we shall at least be freed from the 
vain search for the undiscovered and 
undiscoverable essence of the term species. 
(Darwin 1859, 485) 
Once again it is important that it is the species category—‘the 
essence of the term species’, as he puts it—about which Darwin is 
here concerned, and this is because he wants there to be space for 
the process of species origination that he is defending in the Origin. 
This is a process whereby, within a single species, more and more 
distinctive and stable varieties slowly and gradually diverge until at 
some point they are distinctive enough and stable enough to 
deserve to be considered distinct species and designated as such.  
Does Darwin think species are undefinable? Clearly not. Con-
sider the following passages, also from the concluding chapter, 
where Darwin is explaining the advantage for systematics of the 
view he is defending. 
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Systematists will have only to decide…whether any 
form be sufficiently constant and distinct from 
other forms, to be capable of definition; and if 
definable, whether the differences be sufficiently 
important to deserve a specific name. (Darwin 
1859, 484) 
Hence…we shall be led to weigh more carefully 
and to value higher the actual amount of difference 
between two forms. (Darwin 1859, 485) 
Again, Darwin is stressing the importance of the degree of 
constancy and difference in deciding when a species designation is 
important. There is no skepticism about giving a specific name and 
definition in this passage. Darwin is stressing that greater value 
should be given to what Aristotle would call ‘more-and-less differ-
ences’ between forms. And again, this is for him a matter of making 
conceptual space for the sort of process he is imagining is the 
source of new species. 
6. Aristotle and Darwin: Common Ground and Worlds 
Apart 
Explaining the subtle differences between forms of a kind is a 
shared goal of Aristotle and Darwin, and both see differences be-
tween forms of a kind falling along measurable continuua. For both 
of them, explanations of such differences will most often, but not 
always, appeal to the value of the difference to the organism. 
Neither Aristotle nor Darwin consider taxonomic ranking as 
written into nature by a Creator God. Both of them think the way 
we classify organisms should be tied to our explanatory goals, and 
both of them think that while there are actual, measurable 
similarities and differences that form the basis of our classi-
fications, it is up to us to decide when those similarities and 
differences are sufficient to identify new forms or bring many 
forms together into one kind. 
Yet it is equally important to remember that these two brilliant 
thinkers were worlds, and millennia, apart. Eighteenth Century 
Europe saw an explosive growth in knowledge and understanding 
of fossil sequences and assemblages worldwide and of the relation-
ship between recent fossils and current populations in different 
regions—along with a parallel explosion in knowledge and 
understanding of the amazingly complex geographic patterns of 
23
Lennox: Aristotle and Darwin
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2017
24 
 
 
distribution of species. The complexity was in part due to an 
explosive growth in the discovery of completely unknown orders 
of organisms, distinctive to newly explored and colonized biogeo-
graphic regions. None of this knowledge was available to European 
thinkers even two hundred years before Darwin, let alone two 
thousand. 
And it had momentous consequences. It led to the recognition 
of the need for a classification system capable of indefinite expan-
sion, with Carl Linnaeus taking the leading in fulfilling that need. 
For the first time in history there was an urgent need for an 
explanation for the puzzling patterns, both regional and global, in 
the fossil record and in the geographic distribution of species, and 
Georges Cuvier played an important role in bringing newly 
discovered fossils into systematic relation with current species. 
Rather quickly, a number of thinkers realized that descent with 
modification, as Charles Darwin would call it, was a possible 
solution. Charles Darwin supplied the most satisfying solution of 
this kind, but he was far from the first—among his French 
predecessors were the Comte du Buffon, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, 
and Geoffroy St. Hiliare; in Great Britain there were Charles’ 
grandfather Erasmus Darwin, Robert Grant, his early mentor at 
Edinburgh, Robert Chambers, the no longer anonymous author of 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, and Alfred Russell Wallace, 
author of the paper that pushed Darwin to rush On the Origin of 
Species to completion. Evolutionary thinking was a response to the 
need for a comprehensive explanation of a vast range of inform-
ation unavailable until the 18th century. It is hard to imagine how 
Aristotle would have responded to that information—that is 
certainly not a thought experiment I am interested in pursuing. 
But we do know how Darwin responded to what Aristotle had 
accomplished. In the last two months of his life, Darwin reads 
Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals for the first time. To remind the 
reader of his note to William Ogle, Aristotle’s translator: 
From quotations which I had seen I had a high 
notion of Aristotle's merits, but I had not the most 
remote notion what a wonderful man he was. 
Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, 
though in very different ways, but they were mere 
school-boys to old Aristotle. 
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What I did not share with the reader when I originally quoted that 
note of Darwin’s was William Ogle’s utterly charming response:  
Thank you for your kind and eulogistic letter re 
“the parts of animals.” It gave me much pleasure. I 
am glad also to have added a third person to your 
gods and completed the Trinity…17 
As a more recent translator of On the Parts of Animals for Oxford, 
and an admirer of Charles Darwin, I enjoy imagining that when 
Darwin could do little else with his time, he found pleasure in 
reading Aristotle’s De Partibus and was not in too much pain to 
smile at Ogle’s irreverent note. 
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